University of Wyoming College of Law

Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship
Faculty Articles

UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship

4-18-2017

Fear and Loathing in Persuasive Writing: An Empirical Study of the
Effects of the Negativity Bias
Kenneth D. Chestek
University of Wyoming College of Law, kchestek@uwyo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles

Recommended Citation
Chestek, Kenneth D., "Fear and Loathing in Persuasive Writing: An Empirical Study of the Effects of the
Negativity Bias" (2017). Faculty Articles. 38.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles/38

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship at Law
Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Fear and Loathing in Persuasive Writing:
An Empirical Study of the Effects of the Negativity Bias
Kenneth D. Chestek1
I.

Introduction
People naturally prefer positive people to negative ones. They naturally
respond better to those who are kind than those who are not. Logically,
then, the ideal strategy for a candidate would be to make his or her
campaign as positive and as cordial as possible.2
One might wish that the sentiment expressed above by a hopeful graduate

student were true. It seems to make intuitive sense. However, those words were
penned a full year before the unexpected outcome of the 2016 Presidential election,
in which the candidate who ran the most negative, attack-filled campaign in recent
memory won the office against a candidate whose campaign motto was “Love

Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the Center for the Study of Written
Advocacy, University of Wyoming College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professors Linda
Edwards, Michael Smith, Steve Johansen and Lance Long for reviewing early drafts of this work. I
also wish to thank psychology professors Narina Nunez (University of Wyoming) and Monica Miller
(University of Nevada Reno) for talking me through the process of designing a scientifically reliable
study. I took most of their advice; any errors in the design of the study are probably the result of the
few situations in which I chose a different strategy. Thanks also to Magistrate Judge Andrew
Wistrich of the United States District Court for the Central District of California for his valuable
insight and recommendations about the design of the study. I also wish to thank the participants at
the Fourth Annual West Coast Rhetoric Workshop sponsored by the William S. Boyd School of Law
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, for their excellent comments; in particular Brian Wall,
Maureen Johnson and Lydia Nussbaum provided very useful feedback during the small group
session devoted to critiquing this paper. Finally, I owe a great deal to Jasmine Fathalla, 2016
candidate for the J.D. degree from the University of Wyoming. Jasmine was my research assistant
for two years on this project, assisting with everything from legal research into the issues presented
in the hypothetical case to helping solicit and compile responses to the test. Her assistance with this
project was invaluable.
2
Peter A. Gregory, Comparing the Effectiveness of Positive and Negative Political Campaigns,
7(11) INQUIRIES J. (2015), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1311. At the time of publication, the
author was seeking a master’s degree in public administration at Brigham Young University.
1
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Trumps Hate.”3
Politics is a form of persuasion, of course. So what does it say about the
human psyche when the most negative campaigner in a field of 17 candidates rises
to the top and wins not only his party’s nomination, but the office itself? More
importantly, are the lessons from the political arena transferable to another form of
persuasion: written legal advocacy?
I have written previously about the human brain’s inherent negativity bias.4
The term “negativity bias” refers to the brain’s natural inclination to attend to and
process negative stimuli. Part II of this article will provide a brief summary of that
phenomenon. At the end of my previous article, I posed some questions about how
the negativity bias might influence the selections that legal writers might make,
and suggested that some empirical evidence might help advocates craft the most
powerful messages for their clients.
This article reports the results of an 18-month long empirical study that I
conducted, investigating the power of negative themes in written advocacy. For the
study, I wrote a series of nine preliminary statements about a hypothetical case.
Eight of those statements embodied either a positive or a negative theme, as I will
describe below; the ninth was simply a neutral recitation of the procedural posture
of the case. I then recruited 163 judges from different jurisdictions and in different

The fact that Hillary Clinton actually won more popular votes, however, might still give the
student (and perhaps some readers of this article) a measure of solace.
4
Kenneth Chestek, Of Reptiles and Velcro: The Brain’s Negativity Bias and Persuasion, 15
NEV. L.J. 605 (2015).
3
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types of courts, and asked each of them to read one of the nine different preliminary
statements as well as a stipulation of facts common to all nine test conditions. I
then sought to measure what effect, if any, the negative stimuli in the preliminary
statements might have had on the judge’s perception of the case.
Part III of this article first describes the test instrument that I designed, then
concludes by describing the administration of the test, from recruitment of test
participants to the gathering and collating of the data. Part IV then reports the
results of that test. Finally, in Part V, I provide some analysis of what I think the
results show.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the bottom line findings are complex. In some
situations, negative themes seem to be very important in priming a reader to
disfavor the opposing party; in other situations negative themes backfire. For
example, a negative theme seems to focus the judge’s attention on the facts of the
case, while a positive theme tends to focus the judge’s attention on the law. Also, a
negative theme might help a weaker party attack a large, more powerful adversary,
but when the more powerful adversary uses a negative theme, the judge might
instead be inclined to protect the weaker party.
Several things do appear to be consistent, however. First, priming (using a
Preliminary Statement summarizing the case and the themes the advocate will
present) as the very first thing a reader sees seems to have a great deal of
persuasive impact. And second, presenting a negative theme tends to focus the
reader’s attention on the facts of the case, while using a positive theme tends to
-3-

focus the reader’s attention on the law. Thus, if an advocate feels she has a stronger
fact-based argument, she may choose a negative theme, while if she feels her lawbased arguments are stronger, she may choose a positive theme instead.

II.

The science of the negativity bias
Cognitive psychologists have been studying the negativity bias for many

years. One of the first studies to identify the bias was published in 2001, when a
group of cognitive psychologists at Case Western Reserve University surveyed all of
the then-current studies that compared the relative strength of positive and
negative stimuli.5 Many of the studies surveyed in the Case Western study suggest
that negative information is retained longer and affects us more because it is
processed by the brain more thoroughly. This is possibly because it is evolutionarily
adaptive behavior.6 That is, bad things can kill us, while good things generally
cannot. Organisms that are more attuned to detecting and reacting to bad things
are therefore more likely to survive.
Because the negativity bias is thought to be an evolutionary adaptation, it is
very deeply seated in our psyches. It probably resides in the amygdalae, the portion
of the brain that is closely associated with emotional processing and fear responses.

5

Roy Baumeister et al., Bad Is Stronger than Good, 5 REV. OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 323

(2001).
6

Id. at 325.
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Neuroscientist Paul MacLean first developed the theory that our brains
evolved in three stages, which he called the “triune brain.”7 The first brain structure
to evolve was what he termed the “protoreptilian formation” or R-complex (which
many people now refer to as the “reptilian brain”).8 The reptilian brain controls
involuntary motor movements, instinctive behaviors, as well as the so-called “fight
or flight” response; its primary function is self-preservation of the organism.9 Next,
the paleomammalian brain (also called the “limbic system”) evolved, primarily

7

P.D. MACLEAN , THE TRIUNE BRAIN IN EVOLUTION: ROLE IN PALEOCEREBRAL FUNCTIONS

(1990).
Id. at 15.
For a more colorful, albeit less scientific, explanation of the function of the reptilian brain,
see DAVID BALL & DON KEENAN, REPTILE: THE 2009 MANUAL OF THE PLAINTIFF’S REVOLUTION (2009).
They base their conclusions on MacLean’s “triune brain” theory. Id. at 13. They write:
8
9

The Reptilian brain houses basic life functions, such as breathing, balance, hunger,
the sex drive, and the fundamental life force: survival. The Reptile does not tend to
these functions solely to keep you alive. Her larger purpose is to keep your genes
alive and spread as many of them as possible into future generations. This impulse
drives all life. Even people who want no children cannot normally get rid of the
Reptilian imperative of personal survival. Nor can they get rid of the Reptilian drives
that the Reptile has developed for the creation and nurturing of children (such as the
sex drive).
We like to believe we are run by logic and emotion. Sometimes we are. But when
something we do or don’t do can affect C even a little C our safety or the propagation
and safety of our genes, the Reptile takes over. If your cognitive or emotional brain
resists, the Reptile turns it to her will. The greater the perceived danger to you or
your offspring, the more firmly the Reptile controls you.
In other words, the Reptile invented and built the rest of the brain, and now she runs
it.
Id. at 17. This may explain in part why negative campaign ads are so effective. If they demonstrate a
threat to the viewer or the viewer’s offspring, the reptilian brain automatically kicks in and takes
defensive measures. Thus, a negative appeal such as “Don’t ever vote for that other candidate who
poses such a threat!” may be effective in political campaigns. And as the recent Presidential
campaign showed, even a negative appeal disguised as a positive promise might work: “Vote for me
because [only?] I can protect you from all those other threats!”
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involved with controlling emotional responses.10 MacLean points out that the limbic
system can serve as a sort of “amplifier” for guiding behavior required for selfpreservation and preservation of the species (a function also found in the reptilian
brain).11 Finally, the neomammalian brain (also called the “neocortex”) evolved,
responsible for rational thought.12 Unlike the reptilian brain and limbic system, the
neo-cortex is primarily oriented toward the external world.13
MacLean acknowledges that all three systems are interrelated and to some
degree interdependent14; more recent studies confirm that the three systems must
work together.15 However, the basic concept of the triune brain is still useful in
thinking about the importance of both the reptilian brain and the emotional brain
(limbic system) on the logical brain (the neocortex). For example, one explanation of
the emotional brain is that it evolved so as to make us feel fear or pleasure in order
to do what the reptilian brain deems necessary for survival.16 And as neuroscientist
Antonio Damasio and others have demonstrated, the logical brain literally cannot
function without input from the emotional brain.17 We cannot escape our instincts.18

MACLEAN, supra note 7, at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
12
Id. at 17–18.
13
Id. at 17.
14
Id. at 9. MacLean also points out that these three systems evolved in that order. Id.
15
See, e.g., JOSEPH DECOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF
EMOTIONAL LIFE 98–101 (1996); ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES ERROR: EMOTION, REASON AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN 1–79 (1994).
16
BALL & KEENAN, supra note 9, at 19.
17
See generally DAMASIO, supra note 15.
18
Ball and Keenan put this more colorfully: “Logic cannot budge a Reptile out of survival
stance.” BALL & KEENAN, supra note 9, at 26. Their point is that once the reptilian brain detects a
danger that it believes is a threat to its survival, or the survival of its community, the reptilian brain
springs into action and overrides both the limbic system and the neocortex (the logical brain). (In fact
10
11
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One group of scholars has recently concluded that judges are influenced to
some degree by emotional content, despite their best efforts to avoid it. Judge
Andrew Wistrich and Profs. Jeffrey Rachlinski and Chris Guthrie ran a series of
experiments at judicial education seminars between 2008 and 2013, getting 1,800
total responses to a series of six different hypothetical cases that the judges were
asked to “decide.” In each experiment, judges were asked to render a ruling using
the identical law, but some judges were asked to rule in the case of a sympathetic
party and other judges were asked to rule in the case of an unsympathetic party.
The divergent rulings reported by the judges led the researchers to find what they
called “clear evidence that emotions influence judges.”19
To sum up, the negativity bias is an evolutionary adaptation that helps
organisms avoid or respond to danger. The bias is deeply rooted in the brain’s limbic
system, and involves the emotional brain. Since emotional thinking is closely
related to, and necessary for, logical reasoning, it is unlikely and probably
impossible for one’s rational brain to completely overrule the emotional brain—of
which the negativity bias is an important part.20

III. The test instrument
So what might this mean for advocates? Judges (and some scholars)

it may even recruit the limbic system as a means of overcoming the logical brain.)
19
Andrew Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their
Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 898 (2015).
20
For a more comprehensive treatment of the negativity bias, see Chestek, Of Reptiles and
Velcro, supra note 4.
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frequently admonish advocates to not “go negative.”21 But if negative stimuli are as
much stronger than positive stimuli as the psychology research suggests, wouldn’t
advocates be better served by choosing negative themes and attacking the other
side? It seemed to me as if this question could be answered empirically by asking
judges. However, a direct question (“Do you think advocates should choose negative
themes?”) seemed unlikely to produce a reliable answer, since the negativity bias
operates at a subconscious level and judges (like the rest of us) would not likely be
aware of its influence on our thinking.
I therefore set about to design a controlled experiment designed to measure
how judges reacted to different themes, some positive and some negative, and then
see whether there was any measurable difference between negative and positive
themes. The test methodology would be to write different versions of a summary
judgment brief on a hypothetical case, and then ask a large number of judges
(primarily trial judges) to react to the brief at various points while reading the
See, e.g., Hon. Gerald Lebovits et al., Winning the Moot Court Oral Argument: a Guide for
Intramural and Intermural Moot Court Competitors, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 887, 903 (2013) (advising
moot court competitors that “a winning theme addresses the positive policy implications of a ruling
in the advocate’s favor”); Hon. Frank Easterbrook, Friedman Lecture in Appellate Advocacy, 23 FED.
CIR. BAR J. 1, 6 (2013) (suggesting that advocates confront their opposing counsel’s
counterarguments by dealing with them as part of your “positive theme” of the case); Laurie Lewis,
Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes: When the Appeals Band Plays, Jump from the Client’s
to the Judge’s Shoes to Write the Statement of Facts Ballad, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1017
(2011) (recommending that brief writers emphasize good facts and de-emphasize bad facts to cast the
client in a positive light); Hon. Jane Roth and & Mani S. Walia, Persuading Quickly: Tips for Writing
an Effective Appellate Brief, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 443, 445–46 (2010) (recommending that
advocates present both legally relevant facts and additional facts that add to the human interest in
order to portray the client in a positive light); Hon. Gerald Lebovits, The Legal Writer: Free at Last
From Obscurity: Clarity -- Part 2, 76-JAN N.Y. ST. B.J. 64 (2004) (again advocating that lawyers
“writ[e] in the positive”); Steven Merican, Thoughts from an Unconstrained Practitioner: Writing an
Appellate Brief, or How to Make Tax Law an Interesting Read, 19 DCBA BRIEF 10 (2007) (arguing
that “[r]eadability and persuasiveness are improved by being assertive and positive”). The list could
go on indefinitely.
21
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brief.22
That, of course, was easier said than done. One of the first problems I
encountered in designing the test was to determine what, exactly, I meant by “going
negative.” There are many different ways of doing so, and if I tried to test all of
them, I would need such a large number of participants that it would be impossible
to get a scientifically valid pool of participants. I therefore decided to test two
different forms of negative themes: (a) attacks on the virtue of the opposing side (i.e.
arguments that the opposing side is not worthy of the court’s support), and (b)
attacks on the policies advanced by the opponent (i.e. that ruling in favor of the
opposing side would be against public policy).
Negative attacks on an opponent’s characteristics and negative attacks on the
policies advanced by an opponent are what I call “substantively negative” attacks. A
different way to go negative would be “stylistically negative” attacks. A stylistically
negative attack would take the form of ad hominem attacks, hyperbole and
exaggeration, ridicule, hostile tone, and similar tactics. Those stylistic choices could
be directed either at the opposing client or the policy arguments advanced by the
opponent. I chose not to test stylistically negative attacks because I feared that
judges would easily spot that tactic and reject it.23 When judges admonish advocates

The project was approved by the University of Wyoming Institutional Review Board as
exempt “because the research involves minimal risk.” Email from Collette Kuhfuss on behalf of the
Institutional Review Board, April 20, 2015 (on file with author).
23
Cf. LANCE LONG & WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, Clearly, Using Intensifiers Is Very Bad, Or Is It?,
45 IDAHO L. REV. 171, 175–176 (2008) (suggesting that judges tend to dismiss, and evaluate
negatively hyperbole and exaggeration when asked to rate the persuasiveness of a sentence with and
without the exaggeration).
22
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to not go negative, it is likely that those are the tactics they most dislike, and will
most easily spot and reject. I was more interested in the more subtle, substantive
ways in which advocates might choose to go negative.
A.

Test hypothesis

Based on the psychological research discussed in Part II above, I began the
project with two test hypotheses:
1. Since the human brain is hard-wired to attend to, process, and remember
negative information, a negative theme is more likely to (a) be remembered, and (b)
influence the court’s thinking.
2. This effect is likely to be more pronounced if the negativity relates to the
personal characteristics of the litigants (the first test condition) rather than
abstract policy considerations (the second test condition).
These hypotheses were developed based on my understanding of how the
negativity bias affects most of us in our daily lives.24 The point of the test, therefore,
was to determine whether judges react to negative stimuli in briefs the way that
most of us react to negative stimuli in other areas of our lives.
B.

Test case

For the test case, I wanted to select an issue that was not overtly political,
but might trigger different responses depending on the world-view of the responding
judges. I designed some baseline questions to try to determine whether a
responding judge had an identifiable pre-existing world-view, so that I would then

24

See Chestek, supra note 4.
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be able to determine whether that world-view had any significant impact on the
decision the judge was inclined toward by the end of the test.
I chose to invent a problem involving a small business involved in a dispute
with the federal government. The spectrum of world-views that might be implicated
by such an issue might include, on one side, judges who are inclined to support
individual rights and freedoms, and on the other side judges who are inclined to
support government regulations that are designed to protect the public.25 I also
decided to set the problem in a fictional jurisdiction so as to give comfort to
potential judicial participants that I was not attempting to obtain an advisory
ruling on an actual pending case. However, to make the test case as realistic as
possible I chose to create a case that could be governed by actual federal laws.
The case I invented involved a hypothetical small business, Rochford
Heating, Inc., which manufactured specialty furnaces for mobile homes. One of the
units that it sold to a mobile home manufacturer later malfunctioned, causing a
catastrophic fire, which destroyed the home and caused severe injuries to an
occupant of the home. An investigation by the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) later determined that the furnace
manufactured by Rochford had not complied with numerous private manufacturing
standards that had been adopted by reference in HUD’s standards for the
Of course, these are not mutually exclusive positions; the range of possible views on these
issues is not linear. However, since my purpose in choosing a somewhat political issue was to
attempt to measure whether the judges’ ultimate responses were motivated by pre-existing views as
opposed to reactions to the test variable, it seemed to me that this rough simplification might give
some useful evidence to determine what I was actually measuring.
25
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manufacture of mobile homes.26 The HUD regulations incorporate by reference 214
separate standards published by 35 different entities, including many published by
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a private, 501(c)(3) organization
that creates and promulgates thousands of manufacturing standards that are
commonly used in many industries.
The problem arose because most of the standards incorporated into the HUD
regulations, including all of those published by ANSI, are not public documents;
they are only available by purchasing a license from the organization that
promulgated them. The cost of purchasing access to every standard incorporated by
HUD into the regulations governing manufactured homes would have exceeded
$25,000.27 The cost of purchasing just those standards that turned out to be
relevant to the defect which caused the fire would have been over $2,400; however,
Rochford argued that it would need to purchase all of the standards, at the higher
$25,000 cost, just to determine which ones might be applicable to the heating
system. Due to the high cost, Rochford chose not to purchase the standards.
HUD determined that the fire was caused by Rochford’s failure to conform to
several of the ANSI standards incorporated by reference in the HUD regulations.
HUD sought to impose a fine of $250,000 against manufacturer of the mobile home.
That manufacturer in turn sought indemnification for that amount from Rochford.

24 C.F.R. § 3280.4 (2016).
While the number of applicable private standards incorporated into the HUD regulation is
accurate, the cost of acquiring access to them was an estimate only. I believe the estimate is
reasonably close to what the actual cost would be, however.
26
27
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Rochford then sued HUD for a declaratory judgment holding that the regulations
were unenforceable because requiring Rochford to purchase access to those
regulations from a private entity violated the Administrative Procedure Act, which
requires incorporated standards to be “reasonably available” to the public.28
C.

Test design

Having chosen that legal dispute, I needed to design a test that isolated the
theme as the test variable. I also needed to design a test that could be completed by
judges in a relatively short span of time, so as to encourage participation.29 The test
vehicle consisted of four main sections:
(1)

A series of questions gathering basic demographic information about
the respondent, in order to get some data to evaluate whether the final
sample is representative of the likely universe of respondents.

(2)

A series of questions to gather data to evaluate whether the
respondents had any pre-existing bias that might influence their
responses to the substantive part of the test.

(3)

The substantive test, in which eight different themes were presented
and the responses of the participants are measured.

(4)

A concluding section in which the respondent was asked to decide

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1). I wish to thank my colleague Emily Bremer, Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Wyoming, for suggesting this legal issue to me. See Emily Bremer, On the Cost of
Private Standards in Public Law, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 279 (2015).
29
The complete test, including all nine different Preliminary Statements, can be downloaded
from the author’s SSRN page. Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of
the Power of Story (Survey Tool)(date) (available at SSRN link). The nine Preliminary Statements
are also attached to this article as Appendix A.
28
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which way he or she was leaning based on the information provided to
date, and why.
I will describe each of these sections in more detail and discuss the results in
Part IV, below.
D.

Recruitment of test participants

Once the test was designed, I set about recruiting judges to participate in the
study. This proved more difficult than I had anticipated; who knew that judges
don’t like taking tests any more than the rest of us do?
I set out principally to recruit trial-level judges to the study. This included
either state or federal trial courts of general jurisdiction, small claims courts,
administrative law tribunals, military courts, and tribal courts. Since several of the
methods I used for inviting participants reached appellate court judges as well, five
appellate judges responded.30
From the outset, I wanted judges to participate in the study on paper,
primarily because of the recent scholarship that suggests readers engage with
I decided to include those five responses in the universe of data because many appellate
judges were once trial judges. Moreover, I could not think of a principled reason why the negativity
bias might impact appellate judges more or less significantly than trial judges.
Nothing in the data suggests that five appellate judges who responded had a widely varying view of
the likely outcome of case, either. Of the 93 trial judges of general jurisdiction who responded, 52.7%
leaned toward Rochford by the end of the test, while 32.3% leaned toward defendant and 12.9% were
undecided. Of the five appellate judges in the sample, 80% (four respondents) leaned toward plaintiff
and 20% (one respondent) leaned toward defendant; none were undecided. Kenneth D. Chestek,
Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story (Survey Data)(date) (on file with
author).
Given the low n for the appellate judge category (only five responses), no solid conclusions
can be drawn about whether appellate judges view the case differently than trial judges; but there is
also no red flag in those results that suggests there may be a significant difference in whether the
negativity bias affects one group more than the other. (Note, however, that on another metric, there
may be a difference between trial and appellate judges. See infra discussion at notes 55–56
(regarding whether the respondent viewed the test case as more about the facts or about the law).)
30
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printed material in a different way than do people who only read materials on a
computer screen.31 I wanted to be sure that the study would be taken seriously. For
this reason, my first approach to recruiting judges to participate was through the
National Judicial College (NJC) in Reno, Nevada, which graciously agreed to offer
judges attending many of its classes the opportunity to participate in the study. A
representative of the NJC read a standard introduction and invitation at the
opening of some of its courses, and asked for a show of hands for volunteers to
participate.32 Volunteers were given a test packet (randomly given out so that the
participants had a mixture of different conditions to respond to), and were asked to
take the test on their own and return the test (with no identifying information
included) to a central location, to later be returned to me.
I also solicited volunteers by email through several organizations for judges,
including several organizations devoted to continuing education for judges.33
Recipients of such email solicitations were instructed to contact my research
assistant by email, and she would send them a randomly selected test packet
identical to the ones distributed on site at the NJC. Participants then completed the
See generally ROBERT DUBOSE, LEGAL WRITING FOR THE REWIRED BRAIN: PERSUADING
READERS IN A PAPERLESS WORLD (2010); Ellie Margolis, Is the Medium the Message? Unleashing the
Power of E-Communication in the Twenty-First Century, 12 LEG. COMM. & RHETORIC: J. ALWD 1, 12–
13 (2015).
32
The introduction and invitation to participate did not identify “negativity bias” as the test
variable. Participants were told only that they would be participating in “a test of the judicial
reasoning process.”
33
Among the organizations that solicited participants over their listservs and email were the
American Bar Association Judicial Division, the Michigan Judicial Institute, the National Courts
and Sciences Institute, and the Center for Judicial Studies at Duke University. Several legal writing
colleagues around the country also graciously sent invitations to judges at various levels that they
had contact with, including Prof. Lance Long (Stetson University) and Prof. Brian Sites (Barry
University).
31
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test at their leisure and returned it to my research assistant by ordinary mail. By
doing this, participants solicited by email completed the test under virtually
identical circumstances (hard copy in their spare time) as did the NJC
participants.34
All of these methods resulted in 163 judges from around the country
participating in the study.

IV.

Results
What did I find? This section reports the results gathered from the 163

respondents.
A.

Demographics of the sample

In order to get a sense of how well the respondent pool represented the
universe of judges, the first section of the test vehicle asked each respondent to
identify (a) which of five geographic regions their court sat in, (b) whether the
participant was an active judge or retired, (c) how long (within a range of five years)
the participant had been on the bench, (d) what level or type of court the participant
sat on, and (e) the participant’s gender.
There was no measurable difference in the results based on whether the respondents took
the test at the National Judicial Center or by email. This chart compares the final outcome (who the
respondent tended to favor) as reported by the NJC participants versus the email participants:
34

n participants
Plf wins
Dft wins
Neither

NJC
93
52.7%
33.3%
14.0%

Email
70
54.3%
31.4%
14.3%

The minor variations in the outcomes was judged to be inconsequential.
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Table A reports the demographics revealed by the first section of the test
instrument.
Table A

Region
East
Southeast
Midwest
Mountain West/Southwest
West

21
14
65
23
36

13.2%
8.8%
40.9%
14.5%
22.6%

Yrs. Service on Bench
0–4 years
5–9 years
10–14 years
15–19 years
20–24 years
Over 25 years

58
37
24
20
7
15

36.0%
23.0%
14.9%
12.3%
4.3%
9.3%

Level of court
Trial court
Appellate Court
Military
Administrative
Small claims
Tribal Court

93
5
1
19
35
6

58.5%
3.1%
0.6%
11.9%
22.0%
3.8%

95
63

59.4%
40.6%

Gender
Male
Female

Unfortunately, I do not have complete or accurate numbers as to the number
of judges in each category in the universe of actual judges, so it is impossible to
estimate whether the sample is representative of the whole universe. However,
several possible sampling errors do appear in the charts above. For example, it
-17-

appears that the Midwest and West regions may be overrepresented in the sample,
probably due to the fact that the National Judicial College is located in the West
region, and Michigan is in the Midwest region (the Michigan Judicial Institute
solicitation of its members resulted in a large influx of responses). Likewise, the
sample appears to be skewed towards relatively new judges; 36.0% of respondents
had 0–4 years of judicial experience, and another 23.0% had 5–9 years of
experience. This, too, may be a result of the fact that newer judges may be more
likely to avail themselves of training at the National Judicial College.
It is impossible to determine whether these apparent sampling errors
introduced any bias into the results, however. It is assumed that any such bias
would be minimal, since there is no obvious link between those characteristics
(location and years of experience) and the negativity bias.
B.

Possible pre-existing bias

The second section of the test instrument included a series of questions that
attempted to determine whether the participant held some pre-existing bias that
might interfere with his or her evaluation of the test case.35 From the outset I
wondered whether my test vehicle would actually measure the participant’s
reaction to the test variable, or whether the participant would be influenced by a
pre-existing set of beliefs or dispositions. But I could not simply ask the participant
In essence, I was attempting to determine whether “motivated reasoning” influenced a
participant’s thinking in completing the test. “Motivated reasoning refers to the unconscious
tendency of individuals to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to
the formation of accurate beliefs.” Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (2011), citing Ziva
Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 480 (1990).
35
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whether he or she was “liberal” or “conservative.” For one thing, those labels are too
broad and generally meaningless. For another, I anticipated that participants would
resist answering the question, or even be offended that I asked the question and
then decline to participate in the study. So I designed a series of questions to try to
get at this element more indirectly.
I chose four recent United States Supreme Court decisions that had been
decided by sharply divided courts. All four cases36 involved disputes between a
private individual or company and the government. Three were civil cases, one was
a criminal case. I then provided a synopsis of both the majority and dissenting
opinions, taken from the official court reporter’s syllabus of the case, and asked
participants if they tended to agree with either the majority position or the dissent,
on a five-point scale (1 for strongly agree with the majority and 5 for strongly agree
with the dissent).37 By doing so, I hoped to be able to score each participant on a
scale of “tends to favor the individual or private interest” to “tends to favor the

The four cases I chose were Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(deciding whether a closely-held corporation could ignore, on religious grounds, a government
mandate to provide certain forms of birth control through the company’s health insurance plan for
its employees), J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (deciding whether a
corporation in the United Kingdom was subject to jurisdiction of a court in New Jersey in a products
liability case), Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (deciding whether an alert from a drugsniffing dog on the porch of a home constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment), and Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (deciding whether the power of eminent domain can be used
to purchase blighted property from one private party in order to transfer that property to another
private party).
37
For all four cases, respondents were also given a sixth choice, “I prefer not to express an
opinion.” Out of 652 total responses to those questions, only 6 (less than .1%) stated that they
preferred not to answer. A total of 36, or 5.5%, responded that they were neutral on any of the four
cases.
36
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government.”38
To measure this, I compiled a “worldview score” for each participant in the
study. For each of the four test cases presented,39 each judge was asked to rank his
or her agreement with the majority or dissent. I assigned point values to each
judge’s response as follows:
Strongly in favor of government side

+2

Somewhat in favor of government side

+1

Neutral

0

Somewhat in favor of individual side

-1

Strongly in favor of individual side

-2

I then added together the respondent’s score for each of the four cases to get a
“worldview score.” The maximum of +8 points represented a respondent who
strongly sided with the government’s position in all four cases, while a score of -8
represented a respondent who strongly sided with the individual’s or private
business’ position in all four cases. I then did a scatter plot to visualize the
distribution of worldview scores, as shown in Table B:

In a sense, this was an effort to eliminate “authority bias” as a possible reason for a judge
leaning one way or the other. “Authority bias” refers to the tendency to attribute greater accuracy to
the opinion of an authority figure (unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion.
See, e.g., Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, THE J. OF ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
371 (1963).
39
See supra discussion at note 38.
38
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Gov't v. business/individual preference
0

20
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8
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0
-2
-4
-6
-8

Table B
Each dot on this chart represents a single judge’s worldview score. The plot
reveals what I expected: a pretty diverse set of worldviews. Several judges scored +8
on the scale, a few others -6, but most of the judges fell somewhere in the middle.
I then isolated the judges who ultimately leaned toward Rochford from the
judges who ultimately leaned toward HUD; I also separately analyzed the small
group of judges who ended the test undecided as to whom they leaned toward. For
each group I aggregated the worldview scores by median score and mean score.
Table C reports those results:
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Effect of prior worldview
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
-2.00
-4.00
-6.00
-8.00

0.00 0.55

All responses

0.00 0.55

Government
wins
Median

0.00 0.07

Small business
wins

1.50

1.50

Neither

Average

Table C
This chart shows that, for all 163 responses, the median worldview score was
zero, and the mean 0.55 (a very slight preference for the government’s position,
which is consistent with the preference expressed by the control group for the
government). Among those who ultimately leaned toward the government,40 the
median worldview score was again zero, and the mean 0.55 (again, a very slight
preference for the government). Among those who found for the small business,41
the median score was zero and the mean was an insignificant 0.07. Interestingly,
the only group with a significant worldview score favoring either side was the group
which ultimately could not decide which way it leaned;42 for that group both the
mean and median worldview score was 1.5 in favor of the government.
My conclusion from this was the prior worldview was not a significant factor
40
41
42

This category represented 47 respondents.
This category represented 67 respondents.
This group represented 21 respondents.
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in determining which way a judge was likely to lean by the end of the test. The fact
that the group with the strongest prior worldviews was the group that could not
determine which way it leaned was a strong indicator that the respondents, as a
whole, were doing a pretty good job of setting aside their personal viewpoints in
deciding cases.43
C.

The substantive test

The substance of the test, of course, was designed to test judges’ reactions to
different themes (positive or negative). To accomplish this, I presented the
participants with excerpts of a summary judgment brief. The excerpts each began
with one of nine different Preliminary Statements, eight of which expressed a
different theme.44 I then asked a few questions about the judge’s impressions after
reading just the Preliminary Statement; respondents were instructed not to read
ahead, but to answer every question before moving on. Every participant then read

This finding is consistent with the findings of an empirical study of 253 sitting judges
recently conducted by a group of professors, psychologists and judges. See Dan M. Kahan et al.,
“Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and
Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349 (2016) [hereinafter “Kahan II”]. That study involved a
group of 253 sitting judges, 800 members of the general public, 217 practicing lawyers and 284 law
students. The study first used the Cultural Cognition Worldview Scale to measure respondents’ preexisting beliefs on two dimensions: hierarchy-egalitarianism and individual-communitarianism. It
then presented two different statutory interpretation problems to all participants and asked them
how they would rule in those cases if they were judges. The study concluded that judges and lawyers
tended to converge on their resolutions of the two cases regardless of their pre-existing ideological
leanings, while members of the public and (to a lesser extent) law students tended to reach divergent
resolutions aligned with their pre-existing ideological leanings.
The Wistrich et al. studies described in note 19, supra, reach a similar conclusion. While
those studies provided strong support for the conclusion that pathos matters a great deal (in that
judges reacted more favorably to sympathetic parties and more harshly to unsympathetic parties),
the authors could not detect any significant difference between judges based on party affiliation or
political ideology. Wistrich, supra note 19, at 899.
44
All nine of the Preliminary Statements are attached to this article as Appendix A.
43
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the same Stipulation of Facts, providing more detail about the case.45 In the
hypothetical dispute between Rochford and HUD, both sides moved for summary
judgment, so having the parties jointly draft such a stipulation was realistic. The
stipulation included all of the facts, stated in a neutral tone, that both sides would
choose from in presenting their arguments, and which had been referred to in the
nine different Preliminary Statements. Participants were asked to react to the case
again after reading the stipulation of facts (to see if they had changed their views),
and then reported which party they were inclined to favor after reading just those
two portions of the brief.
The nine different Preliminary Statements included four written by Rochford,
four written by HUD, and a single control version that simply reported the
procedural posture of the case in a neutral manner and which could have been
written by either side.46 Of the four versions written by a litigant, two (each)
presented positive themes (personal characteristics and policy considerations) and
two presented negative themes (again, personal characteristics and policy
considerations). The nine conditions were as follows:

The standard Stipulation, read by all participants, is attached to this article as Appendix B.
The control condition was inserted to measure test validity. Although I tried to create a
hypothetical problem with good policy and factual arguments on both sides, I needed to test whether
the problem was inherently biased toward one side or the other. If either Rochford or HUD generated
more support in a neutral condition, I would still be able to measure the effect of the eight valanced
conditions by measuring how much more, or less, support those conditions generated as compared to
the control condition.
45
46
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Condition

Author

Theme

1

Rochford

Negative (policy)

2

HUD

Negative (policy)

3

Rochford

Negative (characteristics)

4

HUD

Negative (characteristics)

5

Neutral (procedural posture)

6

Rochford

Positive (policy)

7

HUD

Positive (policy)

8

Rochford

Positive (characteristics)

9

HUD

Positive (characteristics)

Of course, identifying these nine conditions was easy. Writing Preliminary
Statements that focused on only the stated test condition proved to be much more
difficult. In a real brief, authors are not limited to choosing a single theme, but in
order to isolate the variable of theme I had to write Preliminary Statements that
were limited in scope to the chosen theme. But each Preliminary Statement focused
on the same rule of law: whether the HUD regulation complied with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e. whether they satisfied the
requirement that standards incorporated by reference were “reasonably available”
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to the parties bound by them.)47
The final section of the test instrument asked two broad, open-ended
questions, inviting a text response. Participants were given a brief synopsis of the
applicable provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, along with a brief
description of a case which holds that when a state regulation incorporates by
reference copyrighted materials as a standard, that material does not lose copyright
protection.48 Participants were then asked to respond to two questions, without
looking back at the sections of the brief they had read: (a) “[p]lease describe what
this case is about,” and (b) “[b]ased only on what you have read so far, in whose
The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to publish in the Federal Register
“substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general
policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency; and . . . each
amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) – (E) (2012). Further, “[f]or
the purpose of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby is
deemed published in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference therein with the approval
of the Director of the Federal Register.” Id. § 552(a)(1).
48
In CCH Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), the
plaintiff claimed that its inclusion of data from another publisher about used car values in its
compendium of used car values (the “Red Book”) did not violate defendant’s copyright, in part
because several states had designated Red Book values as an alternative standard for valuing cars in
insurance claims. The court held:
We disagree also with the district court’s ruling sustaining CCC’s affirmative
defense that the Red Book has fallen into the public domain. The district court
reasoned that, because the insurance statutes or regulations of several states
establish Red Book values as an alternative standard, i.e., by requiring that
insurance payments for total losses be at least equal either to Red Book value or to
an average of Red Book and Bluebook values (unless another approved valuation
method is employed), the Red Book has passed into the public domain. The argument
is that the public must have free access to the content of the laws that govern it; if a
copyrighted work is incorporated into the laws, the public need for access to the
content of the laws requires the elimination of the copyright protection. . . .
We are not prepared to hold that a state’s reference to a copyrighted work as
a legal standard for valuation results in loss of the copyright. While there are indeed
policy considerations that support CCC’s argument, they are opposed by
countervailing considerations. For example, a rule that the adoption of such a
reference by a state legislature or administrative body deprived the copyright owner
of its property would raise very substantial problems under the Takings Clause of the
Constitution.
Id. at 73–74 (footnote omitted).
47
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favor are you currently inclined to rule, and why?” The first question was designed
as a test of memory, since one of the ways the negativity bias manifests itself is that
the negative information is remembered longer. The second question was designed
to test whether the participants who had read a negative theme would express that
theme in responding to the “why” part of the question.
The questions were open-ended for another reason as well: I wanted to see
whether the stated reason was (a) law-based or (b) fact-based. That is, would
respondents report that they were inclined to go one way or the other because the
law required that result, or because the facts of the case suggested that one party or
the other should win? I hoped to see whether the respondents who responded to
conditions involving the personal characteristics of the litigants were more likely to
cite the facts in their reasoning than those who responded to conditions involving
policy-based themes (which might tend to lead them to citing the law in their
reasoning).
D.

Results

So what did the substantive results reveal?
1.

Overall results: Was Bad Stronger Than Good?

Table D compiles the results from all responses.
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All responses
65.7%

70.0%
60.0%

53.4%

50.0%
40.0%

47.1%

42.9%
32.5%

38.6%

33.3%
23.8%

30.0%

24.3%

14.1%

20.0%

14.3%

10.0%

10.0%
0.0%

All

Neutral
Small business wins

All small business All Government
Government wins

Neither

Table D
In this table, the grouping marked “All responses” reports the final result
(“who are you inclined to rule in favor of at this point?”) for all 163 valid responses.
The grouping marked Neutral reports the results only from those who read
Condition 5 (the neutral control version). The grouping marked “All small business”
reports the results from those who read Conditions 1, 3, 6 and 8 (written by the
attorneys for Rochford), while the grouping marked “All Government” reports the
results from those who read Conditions 2, 4, 7 and 9 (written by the attorneys for
HUD).
The Neutral results are pretty much what one would expect: a slight leaning
toward the government, but with significant responses in favor of Rochford and a
significant response of “Neither.” Since that condition simply reported the
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procedural posture of the case with no advocacy, it is not surprising that the results
are fairly scattered.
The “All Small Business” columns are likewise what one might have
predicted. A clear majority of those judges who read Preliminary Statements
written to favor Rochford were leaning toward Rochford even after reading the
neutral stipulation of facts.
The “All Government” columns are surprising. As a whole, the judges who
read Preliminary Statements written to favor HUD had a slight preference for
Rochford after reading the stipulation of facts. That result would not have been
predicted by the neutral control group (which favored the government),49 nor does it
make intuitive sense. Why would advocacy on behalf of the government result in
turning judges toward the other side? To answer that question, let us look
separately at the four different conditions that are accumulated in the last two
groupings of Table B.
2.

49

Specific results broken down by test condition

See infra Table G.
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Table E breaks out all of the responses from judges who read one of the four
Preliminary Statements written on behalf of Rochford.

All small business responses

80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

65.7%

24.3%
10.0%

All Small
Business

72.2%

66.7%

61.9%

28.6%

26.7%

9.5%

Pos (Policy)

Small business wins

62.5%

22.2%

6.7%

Neg (Policy)

18.8%
18.8%

5.6%

Pos (Personal)

Government wins

Neg (Personal)

Neither

Table E
There are no dramatic differences between any of these conditions. When
Rochford argued that HUD’s position would be bad public policy, Rochford won
66.7% of the time, compared to just 61.9% of the time when it argued that a ruling
in its favor would advance good public policy. The results were slightly different for
the personal characteristics themes: Rochford won 72.2% of the time when
advancing a positive theme (i.e. that as a small business, it should not have to bear
the high cost of gaining access to the standards), but only won 62.5% of the time
when it argued a negative personal characteristics theme (i.e. that HUD did not
deserve to win because it was lazy in simply adopting regulations by reference).
Thus, it appears that negative policy themes were a slightly more effective strategy
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for the small business than were negative attacks on the personal characteristics of
the government; conversely, it was slightly more effective for the small business to
show its personal characteristics in a positive light than for it to show how its
arguments resulted in good policy outcomes.
The results were much different for the government side of the case, as
shown in Table F.

All government responses

70.0%
60.0%
50.0%

64.7%

62.5%
50.0%

47.1%

47.4%

38.6%
40.0%

25.0%

30.0%
20.0%

36.8%

33.3%

14.3%

16.7%

23.5%
15.8%

12.5%

11.8%

10.0%
0.0%

All Government

Pos (Policy)
Small business wins

Neg (Policy)

Pos (Personal)

Government wins

Neg (Personal)

Neither

Table F
When the government advanced a negative policy (i.e. that allowing a small
business to escape the reach of HUD’s regulations would be bad policy), it won
62.5% of the time. The positive policy argument (i.e. that allowing HUD to
incorporate private standards by reference was good policy because private
organizations are better equipped to write meaningful regulations) only worked
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33.3% of the time.
On the personal characteristics side, going negative was always
counterproductive for the government. When it argued that Rochford deserved to
lose because it intentionally chose to remain ignorant of what the incorporated
regulations required, the government won only 23.5% of the time. The positive
personal characteristic argument (i.e. that HUD deserved to win because it did a
good job in selecting reliable organizations to incorporate standards from) worked
only slightly better: HUD won 36.8% of the time, but still lost to the small business
47.4% of the time.
To sum up, the negative policy arguments worked better for both Rochford
and HUD. A negative theme aimed at the personal characteristics of the other side
worked well for Rochford, but backfired for HUD.
E.

Investigating the thought processes

Because the test instruments asked for reactions after respondents read just
the Preliminary Statement, and again after respondents read the Stipulation of
Facts, it is possible to track overall changes in attitude as respondents moved
through the exercise. It is also possible to compare the attitudes developed during
the reading process to the final outcome.
However, a caution: after the Preliminary Statement and again after the
Stipulation, respondents were asked two questions: (a) “What opinion do you have
of Rochford Heating at this point?” and (b) “What opinion do you have of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development at this point?” Respondents were
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requested to rate the strength of their responses on a nine-point scale, from -4 (very
negative opinion) to +4 (very positive opinion). These questions were chosen
deliberately to get a sense of the pathos evoked first by the Preliminary Statement,
and then by the Stipulation of Facts. At those two points in the test, all the
respondents knew about the case was the story of the dispute to date; no legal
theories had been developed. My purpose was to determine the extent to which
different types of themes evoked pathos favoring the party writing the brief.
1.

Did the reader’s response shift during the reading process?

Of the 163 responses received, fifteen respondents did not fully report their
opinion of one or more of the parties at the two stages where that information was
requested. Accordingly, it was not possible to determine whether those respondents
had a more or less favorable opinion of the parties, so those responses were
therefore excluded from this analysis.
The remaining 148 responses were then evaluated to determine whether the
respondent had a more or less favorable opinion of one party or the other, simply by
determining whether one party scored higher or lower than the other. Thus, for
example, if a respondent had a negative opinion of both parties, but the negative
opinion of the Plaintiff (Rochford) was stronger than for the Defendant (HUD), that
respondent was reported as having a preference for the HUD. It was also possible
(and happened fairly frequently) that a respondent had equally positive or negative
opinions of both parties; those respondents were reported as neutral.
Table G reports the results for all nine conditions:
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After Preliminary
Statement
Condition

After Stipulation

Final Result

n valid
Favors Favors
Favors Favors
Lean
Lean
responses Rochford HUD Neutral Rochford HUD Neutral Rochford HUD

Neutral

5 (Neutral)

20

30.0%

50.0%

20.0%

45.0%

35.0%

20.0%

35.0%

40.0%

25.0%

1 (Rochford Neg Policy)
3 (Rochford Neg
Characteristics)
6 (Rochford Pos Policy)
8 (Rochford Pos
Characteristics)
All Plf

14
13

71.4%
76.9%

0.0%
0.0%

28.6%
23.1%

71.4%
61.5%

14.3%
30.8%

14.3%
7.7%

71.4%
69.2%

21.4%
15.4%

7.1%
15.4%

20
17

45.0%
70.6%

20.0%
17.6%

35.0%
11.8%

60.0%
82.4%

30.0%
5.9%

10.0%
11.8%

60.0%
70.6%

30.0%
23.5%

10.0%
5.9%

64

66.0%

9.4%

24.6%

68.8%

20.2%

10.9%

67.8%

22.6%

9.6%

2 (HUD Neg Policy)
4 (HUD Neg
Characteristics)
7 (HUD Pos Policy)
9 (HUD Pos
Characteristics)

16
17

0.0%
0.0%

75.0%
94.1%

25.0%
5.9%

31.3%
41.2%

62.5%
41.2%

6.3%
17.6%

25.0%
64.7%

62.5%
23.5%

12.5%
11.8%

14
17

28.6%
17.6%

50.0%
64.7%

21.4%
17.6%

57.1%
52.9%

35.7%
35.3%

7.1%
11.8%

57.1%
47.1%

42.9%
41.2%

0.0%
11.8%

All Dft

64

11.6%

71.0%

17.5%

45.6%

43.7%

10.7%

48.5%

42.5%

9.0%

Table G
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The first grouping reports which party the respondents who read each
condition had a more favorable opinion of after reading just the Preliminary
Statement. Not surprisingly, respondents who read a Preliminary Statement
favoring Rochford had an overall more favorable opinion of Rochford at that point
(66.0% favorable to the Rochford, 9.4% favorable to HUD, and 24.6% neutral). Those
who read Preliminary Statements favorable to HUD had an even more dramatic
preference for HUD (11.6% favorable to Rochford, 71.0% favorable to HUD, and
17.5% neutral). Interestingly, the negative themes presented by both Rochford and
HUD had more powerful effects in favor of the party advocating that theme than
did the positive themes.50 This might be attributed to the relative lack of
information the judge has at this point (just a few paragraphs), requiring the judge
to engage his or her System 1 (fast) thinking, where negativity likely has more
impact.51
The next grouping reports which party the respondents who read each
condition had a more favorable opinion after reading the same (neutral) Stipulation
of Facts. Something interesting is revealed there. Overall, those who read
Preliminary Statements favorable to Rochford had a slightly more favorable opinion
of Rochford after reading the Stipulation (66.0% before and 68.8% after), while

For Rochford, the negative themes scored71.4% and 76.9% in favor of Rochford, compared to
45.0% and 70.6% for the positive themes. For HUD, the negative themes scored 75.0% and 94.1% in
favor of HUD, compared to 50.0% and 64.7% for the positive themes.
51
See infra Part V(A).
50
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those who read the Preliminary Statements favorable to HUD tended to downplay
their previous preference for HUD after reading the Stipulation (71.0% before and
only 43.7% after).52
The final grouping in Table G compiles the respondents’ answers to the final
question of the instrument: “Based only on what you have read so far, in whose
favor are you currently inclined to rule, and why?” Note that this asks a different
question than the previous two, which only asked for the respondents’ “opinion of
the parties” at various stages in the reading process. Just before answering the “in
whose favor are you currently inclined to rule” question, the respondents were given
a synopsis of the applicable law, specifically the relevant text of the Administrative
Procedure Act and a brief report of a case dealing with the question of whether
privately copyrighted standards lose their copyright protection when incorporated
into a state standard (the case held the standards did not lose that protection).
Thus, in answering the final question, respondents were being asked to apply the
law to the facts as they understood them at that moment (i.e. the facts as seen
I’m not sure what to make of this result. One hypothesis was that once the judges read the
Stipulation, they may have concluded that the stipulated facts did not support the claims being
made by HUD in the Preliminary Statement, and therefore reacted negatively to HUD. I tested that
hypothesis by looking at the judges’ reactions to the authors of the brief at various stages of the test.
In addition to asking the judges which way they were leaning after (a) reading the Preliminary
Statement and (b) reading the Stipulation, I also asked the judges what their opinion of the author of
the brief was at both those stages. If the judges believed that the Stipulation did not deliver what the
Preliminary Statement promised, one would expect the judges to have a negative opinion of the
authors of the brief. However, for all judges who read a Rochford brief, 37.3% of the respondents had
a more negative opinion of the author after reading the Stipulation, while 35.4% of all judges who
read a HUD brief had a more negative opinion of the author after reading the Stipulation. (This
compares to 40.0% of the judges in the control group who held a more negative opinion of the author
after reading the Stipulation.) Thus, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the
participants believed that the HUD lawyers misrepresented the facts in their Preliminary
Statements.
52
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through the lens of whatever theme the different conditions presented).
My purpose in doing this analysis was to see whether the different themes led to
significantly different final outcomes. The aggregate data suggests that they did.
Overall, respondents who read Preliminary Statements favorable to the Rochford
leaned in favor of Rochford 67.8% of the time, and in favor of HUD only 22.6% of the
time (9.6% did not indicate a preference). On the other hand, respondents who read
Preliminary Statements favorable to HUD leaned in favor of Rochford 48.5% of the
time, and in favor of HUD 42.5% of the time (9.0% did not indicate a preference).
But the fact that those who responded to Preliminary Statements favoring Rochford
had a stronger response in favor of the party which authored the brief, as compared
to those who read a statement favoring HUD is curious. The control group showed a
slight preference for HUD (35% for Rochford and 40% for HUD, with 25%
uncertain). Given the slightly higher baseline support for HUD, it is curious that
those who read a Preliminary Statement written by HUD showed slightly stronger
support for Rochford.53
Consistent with what was reported above, the results from the HUD
respondents also reveal that the negative themes had dramatically different results.
When HUD argued that Rochford’s policy arguments were bad, HUD won 62.5% of
the time. But when it argued that Rochford was a bad company for failing to
This could be the result of the fact that HUD, a governmental entity, begins with a
presumption of correctness, but as respondents learned more about the case the underdog effect
began to shift the reader’s perceptions. Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that courts sometimes give
deference to “authoritarian institutions.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First
Amendment: the Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 296 (2013). For a discussion of
how the underdog effect might overcome that initial deference, see infra text at notes 78–80.
53
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purchase access to the regulations incorporated by HUD, HUD only won 23.5% of
the time. But note the change in this view over time:

Condition

Favors D after PS

Favors D after Stip

D wins

2 (D Neg Policy)

75.0%

62.5%

62.5%

4 (D Neg Characteristics)

94.1%

41.2%

23.5%

Table H
When HUD presented a negative policy argument in the Preliminary
Statement, 75% of respondents initially favored HUD. That support softened to
62.5% after the respondents read the stipulation, and held at 62.5% by the end of
the test. But when HUD presented a negative characteristics argument in the
Preliminary Statement, the initial reaction of the respondents was over 94% in
favor of HUD. After learning more about the facts in the stipulation, however, that
support dropped dramatically to just over 41%, and dropped even further to 23.5%
by the end of the test. This may reflect nothing more than a result of the fact that,
by this point in the study, the respondent's System 2 processes have kicked in.54
2.

Did the reader’s response depend more on law or facts?

The last two questions of the test asked open-ended questions: (1) “Please
describe what this case is about.” (2) “Based only on what you have read so far, in
whose favor are you currently inclined to rule, and why?” The questions were

54

See infra Part V(A) (discussing System 1 and System 2 processes).
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intentionally open-ended, to test (a) what the reader remembered about the case by
the end of the test, and (b) to allow the reader wide discretion to describe what he or
she was thinking about by the end of the test.
I then read the narrative responses and scored each response as to whether it
reported more facts or more law.55 That is, if the reader reported mostly facts, then
the reader viewed the case as “about” the story (facts) of the case. If the response
discussed more law, the reader viewed the case as about the legal issue. I then
grouped together all responses according to whether those who read positive or
negative themes tended to report more facts or more law, as well as whether the
policy/personal characteristics themes had more effect.
Table I reports the cumulative responses to the first question: what is the
case about?

This was done simply by counting the number of facts reported versus the number of points
of law cited.
55

-39-

What is the case about?

80.0%

71.6%

75.4%

77.0%

75.4%

71.6%

69.7%

70.0%
60.0%
50.0%

55.6%
38.9%

40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%

5.6%

17.9%
10.4%

13.1%
11.5%

13.1%
11.5%

17.9%
10.4%

18.2%
12.1%

13.1%
9.8%

0.0%

Facts

Law

Equal

Table I
This chart indicates that, other than for those who in the control group, a
large majority of the readers thought the case was “about” the facts. This result was
remarkably consistent across all of the valanced conditions. It did not matter
whether a respondent read a preliminary statement from Rochford or defendant, a
negative or positive theme, or a theme about policy or personal characteristics; by
the end of the test the judges believed the case was “about” the facts (i.e. who should
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win versus how does the law work).56
The responses to the second question, however, were much more revealing.
Table J gathers the responses to the question “why are you inclined to rule in favor
of one side or the other?”

Basis of decision
90.0%

80.3%

80.0%
62.7%

70.0%
60.0%

55.6%

53.7%

30.0%
20.0%
10.0%

52.5%

50.8%

50.0%
40.0%

60.6%

39.3%

35.8%

34.3%

34.8%

39.3%

27.8%
18.0%

16.7%
10.4%

9.8%
3.0%

1.6%

4.5%

8.2%

0.0%

Facts

Law

Equal

Table J
My expectation in analyzing this question was that those who had read
conditions based on policy themes would be more likely to report law-based reasons
for leaning one way or the other, while those who read conditions based on the
personal characteristics of the litigants would be more likely to report fact-based
It is not surprising that the control group was somewhat confused about what the case was
“about” since they did not learn very much about the actual controversy; rather they learned about
the procedural posture of the case. More than 41 percent of the control group did not identify either
“law” or “facts” in their responses to that question. Chestek, supra note 35.
56
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reasons for their leanings. Table J reveals that was indeed the case, but only by a
small margin.57 I was surprised, however, to find that this difference was far more
pronounced based on whether the respondent read a positive condition as opposed
to a negative condition. That is, a significantly larger number of respondents who
read briefs based on a positive theme reported law-based reasons for leaning in one
direction,58 while an even larger number of respondents who read briefs based on
negative themes reported fact-based reasons why they were leaning in whichever
direction they leaned.

V.

Analysis of the data
So what does all of this mean?
A.

Judging is System 2 thinking, so pre-existing biases can be
overcome

First the good news: it appears that judges are be able to overcome at least
some of their pre-existing biases.
While Table B above suggests that many judges do have pre-existing
worldviews (in this test case, pre-existing preferences for government instead of
individuals), Table C provides strong evidence that they are able to set aside those

Respondents who read one of the four policy-based themes reported that the case was about
facts 50.8% of the time, while those who read one of the four characteristics-based themes reported
that the case was about facts 62.7% of the time. Conversely, policy-based responders reported that
the case was about the law 39.3% of the time, while characteristic-based responders reported the
case was about the law 34.3% of the time.
58
Respondents who read one of the four positive-themed Preliminary Statements reported that
the case was about the facts 35.8% of the time, while respondents who read one of the four negativethemed statements reported that the case was about the facts 80.3% of the time. Conversely,
positive-themed respondents reported the case was about the law 53.7% of the time, compared to
18.0% of the time for negative-themed responders.
57
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worldviews and rule based only on the law and evidence before them. This may be
because judging is a “System 2” activity, while biases operate at a “System 1” level.
Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman has recently proposed a construct in which
he describes two ways in which the human brain processes stimuli and makes
decisions. He describes “System 1” thinking as intuitive, “fast” thinking; it processes
stimuli almost instantaneously and unconsciously.59 “System 2” is more methodical;
it monitors System 1, articulates judgments and makes choices. It is “who we think
we are;” essentially, it is our conscious, rational self.60 It does not operate
independently of System 1 because “it often endorses or rationalizes ideas and
feelings that were generated by System 1.”61 However, System 2 can be trained to
overrule System 1, which is a good thing since System 1 often makes mistakes.62
Cognitive biases works at a subconscious level, which is quintessentially
System 1 thinking. But a judge reading briefs and processing information to render
a judgment is quintessentially System 2 thinking: conscious, rational, and
deliberate. It is therefore not surprising (and actually pretty encouraging) to see
that the judges in this study successfully overcame their prior world-views and
rendered judgments based on what they had just read.63

DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 21, 408 (2011).
Id. at 21, 408, 415.
61
Id. at 415.
62
Id.
63
It is possible that judges who participated in the study live at the National Judicial Center
might be more inclined to engage their System 2 processes because they were in a setting where they
were getting training to help with those processes. But the data does not suggest that was
happening. I did record the source of the response (i.e. whether the response came from the NJC or
from the email solicitations). Of the 163 responses I received, 93 were from the NJC, and the
59
60
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But note that the “worldview analysis” I did in this experiment tested for
whether judges had a tendency to favor the individual or private interest or tended
to favor the government.64 Only one group of judges (those who remained neutral at
the end of the test) showed any significant preference for the government, but they
were apparently able to set that preference aside and keep an open mind about who
should win. The fact that those judges were able to overcome that preference
through System 2 thinking does not mean that they can also overcome a negativity
bias.
It is also worth noting that most of the psychological studies reported in the
literature documenting the negativity bias test lay persons engaged in non-legal
reactions, primarily involving System 1 thinking.65 Thus, those studies may not be
good predictors of how judges using System 2 processes might resolve legal
disputes.66
B.

Priming matters

remaining 70 were from email. The worldview scores for the NJC responses only closely track the
worldview scores for the universe of all 163 responses, as shown in this chart:
Source
All responses
NJC responses only

Favors government
0.55
0.58

Favors business
0.07
0.47

Favors neither
1.50
1.50

Nothing in this chart suggests a significant difference between how participants at the NJC
approached the test as compared to the universe of all respondents.
64
See supra text at notes 35–42.
65
Chestek, Of Reptiles and Velcro, supra note 4, at [pps.].
66
Lance Long, Is There Any Science Behind the Art of Legal Writing?, 16 WYO. L. REV. 287,
292–95 (2016) (discussing why law-specific studies are important as opposed to trying to generalize
from studies from other fields). See also Kahan II, supra note 43, at 366 (making the point that prior
studies of identity-protective cognition are not reliable predictors of whether judges are susceptible
to that bias, since those studies involved members of the general public and not judges).
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This study also establishes something that will not come as a surprise to
most psychologists and many legal scholars: priming the audience has a significant
impact on how the audience perceives the legal problem.67 But the study may show
something specific that legal writers might take advantage of: Preliminary
Statements in a brief are a great way to prime your reader.
The study was designed so that the only thing that was different in the nine
conditions was the Preliminary Statement. All nine conditions used the same
Stipulation of Facts as well as the same summary of the law. Participants
encountered the Preliminary Statement as the first substantive part of the test, yet
by the end of the test those test participants who had read a Preliminary Statement
written by the small business tended to view the case most favorably to the small
business in all conditions.68 The results for those participants who read a
Preliminary Statement written by HUD were mixed, but were uniformly less
favorable to the small business. In one condition, the participants strongly favored
HUD.69 The lesson here is that all of this persuasion occurred in the Preliminary
Statement: a brief glimpse at the theme which the brief writer has chosen for the

See, e.g., Kathryn Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of
First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305 (2010); Michael Higdon, Something
Judicious This Way Comes ... The Use of Foreshadowing as a Persuasive Device in Judicial
Narrative, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1228–1233 (2010).
68
Combining all four conditions that favor the small business, nearly 66% of participants
leaned toward the small business. Each of the four individual conditions also favored the small
business by amounts ranging from a low of 61.9% to a high of 72.2%. See supra Table G.
69
Combining all four conditions written to favor HUD, 47.8% of respondents leaned toward the
small business, while 37.7% favored HUD; 14.5% were undecided. The four individual conditions
ranged widely, from 60.0% favoring HUD (the negative policy condition) to only 23.5% favoring HUD
(the negative characteristics condition). See supra Table G.
67
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rest of the brief. Preliminary Statements are powerful. Brief writers should pay
close attention to what they put in those statements.70
C.

Negative character themes may not be as effective as positive
character themes, but negative policy themes do seem to be
effective

The focus of this study, of course, was to determine the extent (if any) to
which negative themes affect the judicial thinking process. My test hypothesis was
that they would.71 My conclusion after the test is, like the answers to most
questions, is “it depends.”
Looking at just the four conditions where the Preliminary Statement favors
the small business, it is impossible to discern any meaningful difference between
the positive themes and the negative themes. As noted above, the mean for all four
conditions showed 65.7% favorability toward the small business; each of the
individual conditions was within 6 points of that mean.72 Given the sample size for
each condition, the only fair conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that
readers primed to favor the small business ended up favoring the small business,
regardless of whether the prime was positive or negative and regardless of whether
the prime dealt with policy or personal characteristics.
On the government side, however, there are sharp differences among the four
This study empirically proves the point that Prof. Maureen Johnson makes in her excellent
article studying the introductions to various Supreme Court briefs in recent high-profile cases.
Maureen Johnson, You Had Me At Hello: Examining the Impact of Powerful Introductory Emotional
Hooks Set Forth in Appellate Briefs Filed in Recent Hotly Contested U.S. Supreme Court Decisions,
49 IND. L. REV. 397, 459 (2016) (arguing that brief writers “really do have to grab the reader from the
get-go”).
71
See supra Part III(A).
72
See supra Table E.
70
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different conditions. The mean for all four conditions showed that 47.1% of all
respondents leaned in favor of small business by the end of the test.73 Those who
read positive themes broke in roughly the same proportion: 50.0% of those who read
positive policy statements ended up leaning toward the small business, while 47.4%
of those who read positive personal characteristics themes ended up leaning toward
the small business.74
But something important seems to be happening with the negative themes.
The only condition that resulted in a strong win for the government was the
negative policy condition,75 where respondents favored the government by a margin
of 62.5% to 25.0%. The weakest condition for the government was the negative
characteristics condition,76 where 23.5% of the respondents favored the government
compared to 64.7% favoring the small business.77 Why was one negative theme so
successful and the other so toxic?
It may be that the negative characteristics theme (an attack by the
See supra Table F. Note however that the control condition (a Preliminary Statement that
simply recited the procedural posture of the case without setting forth any theme) resulted in only
33.3% of respondents leaning toward the small business, while 42.9% leaned toward the government.
It is unclear why reading Preliminary Statements slanted toward the government caused
respondents to shift more toward the small business. See supra Table D.
74
See supra Table F.
75
Condition 2, HUD’s negative policy condition, included this statement of theme: “If
Defendant is required to provide free access to all incorporated standards to entities such as
Plaintiff, it is unlikely that private standards organizations would continue to develop those
standards, and the government would be left trying to develop standards on its own, which would be
financially prohibitive.” Chestek, supra note
76
Condition 4, HUD’s negative personal characteristics condition, included this statement of
theme: “Although those five standards were available for purchase from ANSI at a cost of only
$2,419, Plaintiff chose not to purchase the standards and bore the risk of failing to comply with
them. Now faced with paying a $250,000 fine imposed by Defendant, Plaintiff belatedly seeks to
avoid its responsibility by seeking a declaration by this Court that Defendant’s regulations violate
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.” Chestek, supra note 34.
77
See supra Table F.
73
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government against the character of the small business) may have triggered
another psychological phenomenon: the so-called “underdog effect.”78 One group of
psychologists defined that effect as “people’s tendency to support or root for an
entity that is perceived as attempting to accomplish a difficult task, and who is not
expected to succeed against an explicit or implicit advantaged opponent.”79 This
may be “because we are likely to experience and observe numerous underdog
challenges, [and therefore] may identify with the struggles of overcoming such
challenges and with others who face similar obstacles.”80 Since the negative
characteristics theme consisted of the federal government (a large and powerful
entity) criticizing a small business, it seems likely that an underdog effect may have
been triggered.
But no such effect was observed in the negative policy condition, because
policy is different. Policy is forward-looking. Policy arguments seek to maximize
social benefit for all. Professor Michael Smith defines policy arguments as
an argument made by a legal advocate to a court that urges the court to
resolve the issue before it by establishing a new rule that advances or
protects a particular social value implicated by the issue.81
Some of these arguments are based on future implications only, while others are
based on both present and future implications.82 But whether a particular argument

See, e.g., JongHan Kim et al., Rooting for (and Then Abandoning) the Underdog, 38 J. of
Applied Psychology 2550 (2008).
79
Id. at 2551.
80
Id. at 2552.
81
Michael R. Smith, The Sociological and Cognitive Dimensions of Policy-Based Persuasion, 22
BROOKLYN L. REV. 35, 39 (2013).
82
Id. at 54–62.
78
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is future-only or present and future, there is no “underdog” present. “Society”
includes all of us, including the judge. Thus, when the government points out that a
particular result would be bad for society, it is arguing that it is bad for all of us.83
D.

Negative policy arguments sometimes work better than
positive ones

One of the more intriguing results of the study was that while negative policy
themes worked well for the government, a positive policy theme did not.84
The finding that negative policy arguments (i.e. that a ruling for one party
harms society) work better than positive policy argument (i.e. that a ruling for one
party is good for society) probably does not come as a surprise to Prof. Smith, who
predicted this result at the Cognitive Bias Symposium held at Brooklyn Law School
in 2013.85 After analyzing several common cognitive phenomena (loss aversion, the
endowment effect and the negativity bias), Prof. Smith recommended that

Note that negative policy arguments were also effective for the small business, which won
66.7% of the time when arguing that HUD’s policy arguments would harm small businesses. But it is
not clear why the small business’s positive policy arguments were nearly equally as effective: the
small business won 61.9% of the time in that condition. See supra Table F. Perhaps this is a different
manifestation of the underdog effect, in which the small business tends to win in every case against
the much larger government.
84
Negative policy themes resulted in a favorable leaning for the government in 62.5% of
respondents, but only 33.3% of the time for positive policy themes. See supra Table F. For the small
business, however, both types of policy arguments worked equally well (61.9% success rate for
positive policy arguments and 66.7% success for negative policy arguments). See supra Table E.
85
Likewise, it probably does not surprise the psychology professors and students who attended
the Psychology of Persuasion conference jointly sponsored by the University of Wyoming College of
Law and the University of Wyoming Department of Psychology in September of 2015. When I
presented some preliminary findings at that conference, many of the psychology professors in the
audience predicted that the negative personal theme would likely backfire against the government.
[cite to online video of that presentation,
https://wyocast.uwyo.edu/WyoCast/Play/fea7847dd6a842e1861101813b5651671d?catalog=b3edf27d-f
1a3-4752-b149-e95d7c7dd956]
83
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advocates “phrase their policy arguments in terms of avoiding loss.”86
My study appears to confirm Prof. Smith’s advice. Both negative policy
conditions (conditions 1 and 2) resulted in more favorable results for the advocate
than the corresponding positive policy conditions (conditions 6 and 7). On the small
business side, the negative policy condition produced favorable results in 66.7% of
respondents, while the positive policy condition produced favorable results 61.9% of
the time (virtually the same).87 For the government, the results were even more
dramatic: the negative policy condition produced favorable results 62.5% of the
time, but the positive policy condition produced favorable results only 33.3% of the
time.88 This is likely because a negative policy argument (the opponent’s preferred
outcome is bad policy) seeks to prevent future harm, while a positive policy theme
(my client’s preferred outcome is good policy) seeks to preserve the status quo. Prof.
Smith would argue that seeking to prevent future harm (the negative policy
argument) is likely a more powerful claim to a risk-averse tribunal.89
Prof. Smith’s prediction that stating a policy argument in the negative would
be more powerful than stating it in the positive does not, however, explain why
negative attacks on the personal characteristics of the opponent sometimes is less
effective than making a positive claim about the worthiness of your client. One
possible answer may be that negative attacks on your opponent reflect bad ethos.

86
87
88
89

Smith, supra note 81, at 77–78.
See supra Table E.
See supra Table F.
Smith, supra note 81, at 63–65.
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Negative attacks on the personal characteristics (essentially ad hominem attacks)
can be perceived by the audience (the judge) as petty.90 However, negative policy
arguments are not perceived as petty; they are more likely perceived as good ethos
(the speaker is smart enough to foresee the future implications of a decision, and is
able to effectively warn the judge in time to avoid those negative future
implications).91
E.

The negativity bias can shape a judge’s thinking about what
the case is about

One of the most surprising findings from the study is that judges tended to
think differently about the case depending on whether they read a positive or
negative theme in the Preliminary Statement. As noted above, judges who read a
positive theme (whether policy or personal characteristics, regardless of which side
wrote the statement) cited the law as the basis for their leanings more often than
they cited the facts. By a much wider margin, those who read a negative theme
cited the facts as the basis for their leanings more frequently than they cited the
law.92
There were some difference in these results depending upon the individual
conditions each judge read. Table K reflects this more nuanced data.
It may also create a negative mood in the audience; or, as Prof. Smith might say, poor
“medium mood control.” MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN
PERSUASIVE WRITING, 29–31 (3d ed. 2013). As Prof. Smith suggested to me in discussing this article,
negative attacks on the personal characteristics of the opposing party are likely to put the judge in a
bad mood, which may make the message less persuasive.
91
Thanks to Prof. Michael Smith and Prof. Steve Johansen, who both suggested this theory.
92
See supra Table J. Table J reveals that in positive theme conditions, respondents cited the
facts 35.8% of the time, compared to the law 53.7% of the time. In negative theme conditions,
respondents cited the facts 80.3% of the time, compared to the law only 18% of the time.
90
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Detail Basis for Decision
87.5%

90.0%
80.0%

71.4%

70.0%
60.0%

30.0%
20.0%

64.7%

61.1%

55.6%

52.9%
47.1%

50.0%
40.0%

86.7%

84.6%

50.0%
38.9%

27.8%
16.7%

22.2%
16.7% 14.3%14.3%

35.3%

11.1%

10.0%

12.5%

0.0%

7.7%
7.7%

13.3%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Facts

Law

Equal

Table K
As shown above, judges who read a negative theme very strongly cited facts
more often than law as the basis for their leanings; this effect was fairly consistent
across all four of the negative themes.93 In contrast, judges who read a positive
policy condition strongly cited the law as the basis for their leanings; judges who
93

The four negative conditions produced these results:
Facts

Law

Plaintiff negative policy

87.5%

12.5%

Defendant negative policy

84.6%

7.7%

Plaintiff negative characteristics

86.7%

13.3%

Defendant negative characteristics

64.7%

35.3%
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read a positive characteristics theme were pretty evenly divided between citing
facts and law as the basis for their leanings.94
What might account for the fact that negative themes caused judges to think
more about facts than did positive themes? One possibility is that negative themes
suggest to the judge that there is a fundamental disagreement between the parties
about something basic in the case: either a dispute about what happened, or a
dispute about whether the law covers the dispute at all. Both of those possibilities
mean that the court needs to pay attention to the facts to determine what is going
on in the case. A positive theme, however, may suggest that the parties are in
relative agreement about what happened, and that only legal questions remain.95
This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the fact that, in Table K, positive policy
themes led judges to think more about the law in significant numbers, while
positive personal characteristics themes led to a much more even split between law
and fact-based reasoning.
94

The four positive conditions produced these results:
Facts

Law

Plaintiff positive policy

22.2%

61.1%

Defendant positive policy

14.3%

71.4%

Plaintiff positive characteristics

52.9%

47.1%

Defendant positive characteristics

50.0%

38.9%

This theory was suggested to me by one of the study participants. In April 2016 I was invited
to give a presentation to the Michigan Judicial Institute reporting preliminary findings from this
study, including the finding that negative themes tended to cause judges to think more about the
facts while positive themes tending to cause judges to think more about the law. Several members of
the audience had previously participated in the study, and during the question-and-answer portion
of the presentation one of the participants suggested this possibility.
95
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Another possibility is that reasoning with the law (i.e. logos reasoning) is
inherently a System 2 activity, whereas reasoning with facts (which engages the
reader at more of a pathos level) might invoke System 1-type reasoning.96 Since the
negativity bias is most powerful with System 1 thinking, a negative theme may
cause the reader to recall the facts of the case more quickly.97
A deep dive into the data suggests one avenue for further inquiry. As noted
above,98 five appellate judges responded to the survey. Of those five, four focused on
the law as the basis for their leanings, while only one focused on the facts,99
probably reflecting the reality that appeals generally focus on whether the trial
court made an error of law. But a data set of only five judges was insufficient to do
any analysis of whether or how positive or negative themes influenced the thinking
of appellate judges. Additional follow-up studies focusing on appellate judges might

See supra Part V(A).
Thanks to Prof. Lance Long for suggesting this possible explanation. Note also that the
research on priming suggests that priming has a significant effect on memory. Prof. Kathy Stanchi
describes an experiment performed by Thomas K. Srull and Robert S. Wyer, Jr., psychologists at the
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, in which test participants were primed with seemingly
random words, then asked to evaluate the character traits of a hypothetical person named Donald in
several neutral situations. Subjects primed with negative words overwhelmingly assigned the
character trait “hostile” or “aggressive” to Donald, while those primed with positive words assigned
the trait “kind” or “pleasant” to Donald. That priming even affected new information given about
Donald as much as 24 hours later; that is, the subjects remembered the priming and used it to
interpret and encode new information. Stanchi, supra note 67, at 333–334 (citing Thomas K. Srull &
Robert S. Wyer, Jr., The Role of Category Accessibility in the Interpretation of Information About
Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1660, 1670
(1979)).
98
See supra note 30.
99
Trial judges tended to report that their thinking about the case was influenced more by the
facts by a margin of 57.8% (facts) to 31.3% (law), compared to the five appellate judges who reported
that they were influenced more by the facts by a margin of 20% (facts) to 80% (law). Chestek, supra
note 35. This is not a surprising result given the different roles that trial judges and appellate judges
have, but because of the small number of appellate judges in the sample, these results do not appear
to be significant.
96
97
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be helpful here.

VI.

Conclusion
Like most strategic decisions facing a lawyer, the choice to use a negative

theme is fairly complex. My study suggests that if you believe you have strong facts,
a negative theme might cause the court to look at the facts more closely. If you
think the law is your strongest argument, a positive theme my prompt the court to
look more closely at the law.
My study also confirms empirically the theoretical claim that policy
arguments are more powerful if stated in the negative (that is, in terms of avoiding
loss rather than providing a gain). And it provides strong support for the notion
that, if court rules permit you to write an Introduction or a Preliminary Statement,
you should always do so, because such statements can have a powerful impact on
how the reader understands the rest of what you write.
All of these conclusions are tempered, of course, by the inherent limitations of
a study like this. Primary among those limitations is the artificial nature of the test.
In order to isolate the variable of negative vs. positive themes, I had to write
Preliminary Statements that employed only one such theme, often in an
exaggerated form. In a real court case, advocates will not be limited to a single
theme. However, hopefully this study will provide some basis for advocates to
choose if, when, and how to “go negative”:


Priming matters! Whatever theme you choose (positive or negative), be sure
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it is expressed in some fashion in a Preliminary Statement (or Introduction)
to your brief.


If you want the court to focus on the facts of your case, choose a negative
theme.



Always state policy arguments in terms of avoiding negative outcomes.



If you represent a more powerful party against a relatively weaker policy,
going negative may backfire.
In other words, to borrow a catchphrase: let’s be careful out there!100

Sgt. Phil Esterhaus (as played by Michael Conrad), Hill Street Blues (1981–84),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Conrad.
100
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Appendix A
Test condition 1 (Rochford, negative policy)
After an administrative investigation, Defendant, United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development imposed a fine of $250,000
against Pilot Manufactured Homes, Inc., (“Pilot”) after a fire destroyed one of
Pilot’s manufactured homes. The fine arises from HUD’s finding that a
furnace manufactured by Plaintiff, Rochford Heating, Inc., and installed in
the home, did not comply with Defendant’s regulations on manufactured
home safety. Pilot has made a claim against Plaintiff for indemnification.
The Defendant’s regulations incorporate by reference 214 standards
adopted by 35 different private agencies, all of which claim a copyright in
those standards. The incorporated standards are only available by purchase
from the private agencies, and noncompliance with those proprietary
standards results in civil penalties. Purchasing the entire set of private
standards applicable to manufactured homes would have cost Plaintiff more
than $25,000.
The private standards place a significant financial burden on small
businesses such as Plaintiff. Defendant failed to make the standards
reasonably available to persons in Plaintiff’s position, because it allows
agencies to earn a profit from the sale of private standards, which have the
force of law. Failure to provide entities such as Plaintiff with free or minimal
cost access to the standards unduly burdens small businesses and thereby
reduces competition in the marketplace. It is against public policy for private
entities to “copyright the law.” Therefore, Plaintiff seeks declarative relief
holding that Defendant’s regulations are unconstitutional because they deny
Plaintiff due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and requests that this Court grant Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment.
Test condition 2 (HUD, negative policy)
Plaintiff, Rochford Heating, Inc., sold more than 1,500 furnaces to Pilot
Manufactured Homes, Inc., (“Pilot”), a builder of manufactured homes. One of
Pilot’s homes was destroyed in a fire and resulted in serious injuries to an
occupant of that home. After an investigation, Defendant, United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development determined that Plaintiff’s
furnaces violated five standards on manufactured home safety, and therefore
imposed a $250,000 fine on Pilot. Pilot in turn sought indemnification from
Plaintiff.
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All five standards violated by Plaintiff were promulgated by the
American National Standards Institute, a private standards organization.
Those standards are incorporated by reference in the Defendant’s
regulations, pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 3280.4 (2008). Purchasing those five
standards from ANSI would have cost Plaintiff only $2,419.
It was Plaintiff’s responsibility, as a business owner and supplier of
goods that are intended to be in manufactured homes, to gain access to all
applicable standards through the private agencies provided. If Defendant is
required to provide free access to all incorporated standards to entities such
as Plaintiff, it is unlikely that private standards organizations would
continue to develop those standards, and the government would be left trying
to develop standards on its own, which would be financially prohibitive.
Therefore, this Court should declare that the Defendant’s regulations comply
with the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment because the
incorporated standards were made known, and were reasonably available to
entities such as Plaintiff. The Court should therefore grant Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.
Test condition 3 (Rochford, negative characteristics)
The Defendant, United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development, publishes safety regulations for the construction of
manufactured homes. Those regulations incorporate by reference 214
different private standards, promulgated by 35 different private agencies, all
of which claim a copyright in those standards. The private standards are only
available to manufacturers by purchasing them from the private agencies. To
purchase all 214 standards would cost Plaintiff, Rochford Furnaces, Inc.,
more than $25,000, despite the fact that its entire gross profit generated in
the past five years from the sale of these furnaces amounted to only $74,195.
Incorporating private standards into public law allows Defendant to
avoid the responsibility of creating fair and public standards. Allowing
private agencies with close ties to the industries for whom the standards are
intended raises serious questions as to whether the standards are reasonable
or are designed to favor large companies over smaller ones like the Plaintiff.
Defendant is now seeking to impose a $250,000 fine because it claims a
furnace manufactured by Plaintiff did not comply with a proprietary,
copyrighted standard that is not freely available to the public. Defendant
could easily insist that private standards agencies provide free online access
to any proprietary standard that Defendant incorporates by reference in its
regulations.
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For these reasons, this Court should declare Defendant’s regulations to
be in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and grant
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Test condition 4 (HUD, negative characteristics)
Plaintiff, Rochford Heating, Inc. builds furnaces for manufactured
homes. One of the furnaces it built was incorporated into a manufactured
home constructed and sold by Pilot Manufactured Homes, Inc., (“Pilot”). That
furnace caused a catastrophic fire, resulting in serious injuries to the
occupants of that home. An investigation by the Defendant, United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) found that the
furnace did not comply with five different standards promulgated by the
American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), incorporated by reference
into HUD’s safety regulations for manufactured homes.
Although those five standards were available for purchase from ANSI
at a cost of only $2,419, Plaintiff chose not to purchase the standards and
bore the risk of failing to comply with them. Now faced with paying a
$250,000 fine imposed by Defendant, Plaintiff belatedly seeks to avoid its
responsibility by seeking a declaration by this Court that Defendant’s
regulations violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Due to
Plaintiff’s disregard in failing to obtain copies of the standards, Defendant
requests this Court grant its motion for summary judgment.
Test condition 5 (Neutral control)
Plaintiff, Rochford Heating, Inc., brought this action for declarative
relief against Defendant, United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development, after a furnace it manufactured and sold to Pilot Manufactured
Homes, Inc. (“Pilot”), malfunctioned and caused a fire. After an investigation,
Defendant determined that the furnace violated five standards published by
the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), which were
incorporated by reference in Defendant’s safety regulations for manufactured
homes. Defendant fined Pilot $250,000 for noncompliance, and Pilot in turn
sought indemnification from Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief
voiding the proposed fine on the basis that Defendant’s regulations deny
Plaintiff due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The only way Plaintiff could obtain copies of the
standards was by purchasing them from ANSI, a private entity. Both parties
have moved for summary judgment.
Test condition 6 (Rochford, positive policy)
Plaintiff, Rochford Heating, Inc., brought this action for declaratory
judgment to require Defendant, United States Department of Housing and
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Urban Development to provide free or low-cost access to any standards
Defendant incorporates by reference in it regulations pertaining to
manufactured homes. Defendant is attempting to impose a fine of $250,000
because a furnace manufactured by Plaintiff and installed into a
manufactured home failed to comply with several copyrighted standards
published by the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”). Those
standards, which can only be obtained by purchasing them from ANSI, were
incorporated by reference into Defendant’s regulations for manufactured
homes.
Public policy demands that standards which have the force of law
should be freely available to the public. Free public access to the standards
will benefit society by ensuring that manufacturers such as Plaintiff are
aware of the standards, and thereby encourage compliance. Moreover, since
the standards are intended to protect the public, free access to those
standards would allow members of the public to detect and help enforce
violations of those standards. Therefore, this Court should declare
Defendant’s regulations for manufactured homes unconstitutional as
violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment.
Test condition 7 (HUD, positive policy)
Defendant, United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development, promulgates manufactured home construction and safety
standards to ensure safety to consumers. This regulation incorporates by
reference many standards developed by industry groups and private
standards organizations, thereby benefitting from the specialized knowledge
and expertise possessed by those groups. Defendant only incorporates
standards created by independent agencies, such as the American National
Standards Institute (“ANSI”), and similar groups that promote public safety
rather than industry convenience.
Plaintiff, Rochford Heating, Inc., seeks a declaration that Defendant’s
regulations do not provide due process of law and therefore violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the only way Plaintiff
could obtain the incorporated standards was by purchasing them from ANSI.
However, allowing standards agencies to generate revenue through the sale
of their standards at reasonable prices encourages these agencies to continue
to develop standards, thereby relieving the government of the substantial
burden to develop such standards on its own. Moreover, relying on private
agencies with special expertise in particular industries insures that the
standards are relevant and suitable for those industries, and more likely to
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promote safety than any standard created by Defendant. Defendant therefore
requests that this Court grant its motion for summary judgment.
Test condition 8 (Rochford, positive characteristics)
Plaintiff, Rochford Heating, Inc., is a small business entity. It works
with Pilot Manufactured Homes, Inc., (“Pilot”), which manufactures
affordable homes for low-income individuals. Plaintiff supplies Pilot with
furnaces specially designed to fit Pilot’s needs, and sells those furnaces to
Pilot at less than $1,000 per unit. To date, it has sold 1,562 units to Pilot and
has generated a gross profit of only $74,195 from those sales.
Unfortunately, one of the furnaces sold by Plaintiff and installed in one
of Pilot’s manufactured homes was involved in a fire, resulting in personal
injuries to one of Pilots’ customers. An investigation by Defendant, United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development determined that the
failed unit did not comply with Defendant’s safety standards for
manufactured homes. As a result, Defendant seeks to impose a $250,000 fine
on Pilot, which in turn seeks indemnification from Plaintiff.
The standards Defendant seeks to enforce were promulgated by
private standards agencies and incorporated by reference in Defendant’s
regulations. Those regulations incorporate 214 separate standards
promulgated by 35 different private standards agencies, and are available
only to individuals and businesses that agree to purchase the standards from
the private agencies. The total cost for Plaintiff to purchase all 214 standards
would have been in excess of $25,000.
If a governmental agency wishes to incorporate private standards in its
binding regulations, it should insist that those agencies make the standards
freely available to the public, including those small businesses who are
expected to comply with those standards. Doing so would have allowed
Plaintiff to obtain copies of all applicable standards and have a fair chance of
competing with larger businesses, which can spread the cost of compliance
over a much larger number of units sold. Accordingly, this Court should
declare that Defendant’s regulations are unconstitutional as violating the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and grant Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment.
Test condition 9 (HUD, positive characteristics)
To ensure the safety of manufactured homes to consumers, Defendant,
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, promulgates
regulations that manufacturers must comply with. Defendant’s regulations
incorporate by reference numerous standards written by 35 different private
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standards agencies, all of which have special expertise in various aspects of
manufactured home construction. Defendant does not have sufficient
expertise in all of those aspects, nor the manpower to independently create
all of the necessary safety standards, so its reliance on private standards
agencies is reasonable and effective.
Defendant requires that the standards it incorporates by reference be
made reasonably available to the public, and monitors the agencies whose
standards are incorporated to insure that the prices those agencies charge
are not prohibitive.
Plaintiff, Rochford Heating, Inc., manufactures furnaces installed in
homes built by Pilot Manufactured Homes, Inc. (“Pilot”). When one of those
furnaces caused a catastrophic fire in a home sold by Pilot, Defendant
determined that the furnace failed to comply with its safety regulations, and
imposed a fine on Pilot. Plaintiff, which is contractually obligated to
indemnify Pilot for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Defendant’s regulations,
now seeks a declaration that Defendant’s regulations violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
are therefore unconstitutional. Because incorporating private standards
insures that the safety regulations are comprehensive and reasonable, and
because the harm which resulted from Plaintiff’s failure to comply with those
standards is exactly the sort of harm the regulations are intended to prevent,
this Court should deny relief to Plaintiff and grant Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.
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Appendix B
The following is the standardized Stipulation of Facts that every participant
read:
Stipulation of Facts
Plaintiff and Defendant in the above cause stipulate to the following facts.
The parties agree that no further proof of such facts is necessary, and that the
stipulated facts may be used in evidence and argument of counsel as though duly
proven through admissible evidence. Both parties, however, reserve the right to
dispute the relevance of any of these facts. The facts stipulated are as follows:
1.
Defendant, United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development has promulgated Manufactured Home Construction and Safety
Standards. 24 C.F.R. § 3280.1 (2008) [hereinafter Regulation] (stating the
regulation covers “all equipment and installations in the design, construction,
transportation, fire safety, plumbing, heat-producing and electrical systems of
manufactured homes which are designed to be used as dwelling units.”).
2.
The Regulation incorporates by reference various standards
promulgated by private organizations, which “are available for purchase from the
organization that developed the standard . . . .” 24 C.F.R. § 3280.4 (2008). Any
violations of the incorporated standards may result in civil penalties.
3.
The Regulation incorporates 214 privatized standards, promulgated
through 35 different agencies.
4.
Pilot Manufactured Homes, Inc., (“Pilot”), manufactures homes that
are covered by the Regulation, and qualifies as a manufacturer for purposes of 24
C.F.R. § 3280.2.
5.
Between 2010 and 2015, Pilot purchased from Plaintiff, Rochford
Heating, Inc., 1,562 mobile home furnaces, which Pilot installed in its
manufactured homes. Plaintiff has generated a net profit of $74,195 from the sale of
those heaters.
6.
The furnaces are manufactured specifically to fit the Pilot home
design, and are not sold to any other home manufacturer.
7.
On January 30, 2016, a home manufactured by Pilot, which contained
a furnace of Plaintiff was destroyed by fire, severely injuring one of the occupants
after being delivered to a customer in Tenspot, West Dakota.
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8.
John Smith, a fire marshal of the Tenspot Volunteer Fire Department,
determined the fire was caused by a malfunction of the furnace manufactured by
Plaintiff.
9.
Further investigation by Defendant revealed that the furnace failed to
comply with the Regulation set forth in 24 C.F.R. § 3280.4.
10.
After the investigation, Defendant fined Pilot $250,000 on the basis
that the furnaces it purchased from Plaintiff did not comply with five standards
incorporated into the Regulation by reference: ANSI Z21.15b-2013/CSA 9.1b-2013
(R2014), ANSI LC 1-2014/CSA 6.26-2014, ANSI Z21.10.1-2014/CSA 4.1-2014, ANSI
Z21.21-2012/CSA 6.5-2012, and ANSI Z21.40.1-1996/CSA 2.91-M1996 (R2012).
11.
Pilot has sought indemnification for the fine from Plaintiff based on
the contract between those parties.
12.
Plaintiff admits that its furnaces do not comply with the standards
specified in paragraph 10, but denies that the failure to comply with the standards
caused the fire described in paragraph 7. Rather, Plaintiff claims that the furnace
was installed improperly by Pilot, or was modified or misused by the owner of the
home, which caused the fire described in paragraph 7.
13.
The standards specified by Defendant listed in paragraph 10 are only
available by purchase in hard copy, or electronic form, from the American National
Standards Institute (“ANSI”) at the prices listed below.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

ANSI Z21.15b-2013/CSA 9.1b-2013 (R2014)
ANSI LC 1-2014/CSA 6.26-2014
ANSI Z21.10.1-2014/CSA 4.1-2014
ANSI Z21.21-2012/CSA 6.5-2012
ANSI Z21.40.1-1996/CSA 2.91-M1996 (R2012)

$ 90
$376
$680
$404
$869

14.

All of the standards listed in paragraph 13 are copyrighted by ANSI.

15.
None of the standards listed in paragraph 13 were published in the
Federal Register. However, HUD did receive the approval of the Director of the
Federal Register to incorporate those standard by reference in 24 C.F.R. § 3280.4.
16.
Defendant periodically reviews the prices charged by all agencies
whose standards are incorporated by reference in Defendant’s Regulation to insure
that the prices are not prohibitive. Defendant retains the right to amend the
Regulation to eliminate one or more of the incorporated standards in the event it
determines that the prices charged are prohibitive.
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17.
The prices charged by ANSI exceed the cost of printing or making
those standards available electronically. The standards are not available in public
libraries or online without paying the specified fee to ANSI.
18.
Plaintiff estimates that purchasing hard copies of, or online access to,
all of the 214 individual standards incorporated by reference in the Regulation
would cost in excess of $25,000.
19.
Plaintiff did not purchase access to the standards through ANSI, which
were incorporated in the Regulation by Defendant.
20.
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant seeking a declaration that
the Regulation is unconstitutional because the standards incorporated by reference
are not “reasonably available” to Plaintiff pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2009).
Therefore Plaintiff seeks an order rescinding the $250,000 fine, imposed on Pilot
but which Plaintiff is contractually obligated to indemnify.
Signed and agreed to this _______ day of _____________, 2016.
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